













Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Mak, V. (2015). What is responsible lending? The EU Consumer Mortgage Credit Directive in the UK and the
Netherlands. Journal of Consumer Policy, 38, 411-430.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
 1
What is Responsible Lending? The EU Consumer Mortgage Credit Directive in the 




I Introduction  
The term “responsible lending” has become a moniker for regulatory reforms in consumer 
credit regulation, and has particularly gained new ground in the wake of the global 
financial crisis. It is now widely accepted that regulation of the financial sector must be 
“responsible” in the sense that it includes protection against over-indebtedness of 
consumers (World Bank 2013). In particular, consumers must be protected in the mortgage 
credit market, where over-indebtedness can have severe consequences for consumers – 
eviction, the loss of their home – and for the stability of the financial system as a whole. 
 This article discusses if and how the recently adopted EU Directive concerning 
consumer mortgage credit agreements (Directive 2014/17/EU) contributes to defining a 
common “responsible lending” policy in the varied contexts of the Member States’ 
mortgage markets.1 The Directive contains a number of regulatory tools which in most 
legal systems in the world would be considered duties of “responsible lending”: it includes 
information requirements that should help consumers make better decisions in relation to 
mortgage credit, duties placing responsibility on lenders to prevent over-indebtedness of 
consumers, as well as some more prescriptive solutions with regard to loan-to-value (LTV) 
and loan-to-income (LTI) ratios.2 In terms of how such duties are implemented into 
national regulation, the Directive leaves much room for differentiation between the 
Member States laws. Apart from the provisions dealing with the standardized information 
provided to consumers through the European Standard Information Sheet (ESIS) and with 
information regarding the Annual Percentage Rate of Charge (APRC), all of the 
Directive’s provisions aim at minimum harmonization rather than full harmonization.3 
More stringent duties may therefore be adopted or maintained in national laws “in order to 
                                                        
* Professor of Private Law, Tilburg University. DPhil, MPhil (Oxon). 
1 Directive 2014/17/EU on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential 
immovable property [2014] OJ L60/34, recitals 30 and 31. The Directive was adopted on 4 
February 2014 and should be implemented by the Member States by 21 March 2016. 
2 For a brief overview of the Directive’s provisions, see below, p 20. The categories of 
regulatory tools mentioned here correspond to World Bank (2013) at para. 25. 
3 Mortgage Credit Directive, Art. 2. 
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avoid adversely affecting the level of protection of consumers relating to credit agreements 
in the scope of [the] Directive”, taking account of differences in market development and 
conditions in the Member States.4 
 What does this mean concretely for responsible lending policies in the Member 
States? To what extent do Member States’ laws already comply with the EU Directive, and 
in which other ways have they given shape to responsible lending policies? This article 
will approach the question through a comparison of mortgage credit regulation in the UK 
and in the Netherlands. The comparison between both countries is timely, as the adoption 
of the EU Directive follows closely in the wake of recent reforms of mortgage credit 
regulation in both Member States.5 Notably also, besides the regulatory framework, the 
effectiveness of policies seeking to promote “responsible lending” is highly dependent on 
the economic context in which they operate. Interestingly, whilst both countries have a 
very high ratio of household debt to gross disposable income – approx. 145 per cent in the 
UK and 285 per cent in the Netherlands according to the OECD – the default rate on 
mortgage payments does not per se correlate to these high numbers. Defaults in the 
Netherlands after the crisis have been exceptionally low, and even though possession of 
mortgaged properties increased somewhat more in the UK, here also the absolute numbers 
are low (Scanlon and Elsinga 2014, pp. 340-341). That is notable because earlier studies 
have indicated that a correlation can exist between a higher household debt ratio and an 
increase in mortgage arrears (European Commission 2010; Rinaldi and Sanchez-Arellano 
2006; Mian and Sufi 2014). An explanation may be found in institutional features of each 
system, such as tax regimes or government support schemes.6 A study of both systems can 
also reveal which institutional features lend support to a stable housing market, and how a 
responsible lending policy in regulation fits with these different contexts. 
 The structure of this article is as follows. Part I explores the Directive’s concept of 
responsible lending and sketches which other, institutional factors in the UK and in the 
Netherlands influence choices made with regard to the regulation of the mortgage market. 
Parts III and IV give a more detailed account of specific regulation in the UK and the 
Netherlands. Part V compares the Dutch and UK approaches, analysing also which aspects 
                                                        
4 Mortgage Credit Direcive, recital 7. 
5 See below Parts III and IV. 
6 The focus, conform the analysis by Scanlon and Elsinga (2014), is on formal institutions 
such as regulation and subsidies. For a discussion of these factors, see Part II. 
 3
of the experiences in both systems may be informative for developing a more detailed 
common responsible lending policy at EU level. Part VI concludes. 
 
II Responsible Lending Policies: Concept and Context  
“Responsible lending” is a policy term. Although it is used to denote a whole range of 
measures or regulatory tools,7 in effect the term itself does nothing more than to paint with 
a broad brush the desired goal that the legislator or regulator seeks to achieve. Focusing 
mainly on inducing responsible behaviour of market participants, the policy is part of a 
broader context of financial sector management. Policy makers in this area tend to balance 
several financial sector policy objectives: financial inclusion, stability of the financial 
sector, integrity of the financial services providers, and financial consumer protection 
(World Bank 2013, para. 16 ff.). This background is reflected also in the Mortgage Credit 
Directive, which aims to create an internal market for mortgage credit open to all market 
participants (inclusion),8 and – in response to the financial crisis – seeks to contribute to 
the stability of the mortgage market, responsible behaviour by lenders and intermediaries, 
and high levels of consumer protection.9 
The policy of “responsible lending” is given hands and feet through more concrete 
regulatory tools. In many cases, these tools aim at inducing more responsible behaviour in 
all market participants, lenders as well as borrowers. A general definition of the policy, 
consistent with the approach taken by the EU Mortgage Credit Directive, could look like 
this: 
 
the policy aimed at ensuring responsible behaviour of participants in the 
financial market – including both lenders and borrowers –, particularly 
focused on preventing over-indebtedness of borrowers, which is given shape 
through various regulatory mechanisms and which may also be pursued 
through other legal means, such as remedies in private law, or non-legal 
means such as education.10 
 
                                                        
7 See e.g. the list set out before n 2. 
8 Mortgage Credit Directive, recital 2. 
9 Mortgage Credit Directive, recitals 3-6. 
10 Compare World Bank report (2013), in particular para. 23 and para. 32. The report does 
not discuss private law liability. That this is a possibility, as well as sanctions in criminal 
law, is however confirmed in the EU Mortgage Credit Directive, recital 83. 
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Even if the aim of the policy is defined – to prevent over-indebtedness of borrowers – this 
general definition leaves much room for policy makers to fill in their “responsible lending” 
policies according to the specific context in which they operate. That is a relevant point to 
the question whether a common “responsible lending” policy can be defined at EU level 
that fits the mortgage markets of the various Member States. Looking at the institutional 
context of Dutch and UK mortgage market regulation, it becomes clear that responsible 
lending policies are informed by the sources of risk that regulators seek to control. I will 
briefly describe these contexts for the Netherlands and for the UK, making some 
comparative observations between the two countries. 
 
1. The Dutch Mortgage Market 
The high ratio of household debt to gross disposable income seen in the Netherlands – 
approx. 285 per cent in 2012 – could be regarded as a vulnerable spot of its mortgage 
market (European Commission 2010; Rinaldi and Sanchez-Arellano 2006; Mian and Sufi 
2014). Nonetheless, it seems that it is not automatically an indicator that mortgage 
payment defaults will occur more often in that country. Default rates have in fact been 
exceptionally low. A survey in 2011 of mortgage agreements with four major lenders 
revealed that instances in which households were behind with payments – adopting a 
measure of at least 90 days – amounted to only 0.6 per cent of mortgage agreements 
(Kerste et al. 2011, p. 79). Further, most cases in which payment arrears occurred were 
solved, for example by temporary freezes on interest or relaxing the terms of repayment. 
Recent studies confirm that the number of defaults on mortgage payments – currently 
around 100.000 – is still low in comparison to the entire number of existing mortgage loans 
in the Netherlands (BKR 2014; DNB 2014; Expertisecentrum woningwaarde 2014, pp. 11-
12). By comparison, in the UK the number of possessions of mortgaged properties 
increased significantly between 2006 and 2009, but went down again since then and is still 
lower than at the previous depth in the housing market cycle in the early 1990s (Scanlon 
and Elsinga 2014, pp. 340-341). 
Dutch regulators are however much aware of the “Janus faced” profile of the Dutch 
mortgage portfolio. As a recent report by the Dutch central bank emphasizes “[p]ayment 
arrears and losses on mortgages have remained very limited so far, but the very large 
mortgage portfolio remains a vulnerability of the Dutch financial system. The large 
number of underwater mortgages, in particular, will continue to present a latent risk for 
banks and the government for some time to come” (DNB 2014, p. 7). Current estimates 
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indicate that approximately 30 per cent of mortgages are “under water” – meaning that the 
value of the underlying property is lower than the amount of the loan for which the security 
has been given –, which is equal to approximately 1.1 million mortgage loans.11 That 
circumstance not only induces more homeowners to keep their house of the market, even if 
they were thinking of putting it up for sale. It also means that households are vulnerable to 
changes, e.g. a decrease in income or a divorce, as a result of which the sale of a house 
below the value of the mortgage may be inevitable. 
It is tempting to conclude on the basis of these figures that the Dutch legislator has 
been idle in preventing over-indebtedness of households and that the Dutch financial 
market, even if defaults until now have been low, in consequence is hugely vulnerable to 
market fluctuations (see e.g. Dalton 2011). Both conclusions would however be wrong. 
The Dutch legislator, and before then the industry through self-regulation, have since long 
actively sought to limit the risks associated with mortgage loans. In particular – as will be 
elaborated on in Part III – creditworthiness assessments and other tools to prevent over-
indebtedness have been part of Dutch mortgage lending culture since before the financial 
crisis. The high rate of household debt, therefore, cannot be attributed to a lax attitude of 
lenders towards “responsible lending”. More plausibly, Dutch households are less 
vulnerable than this rate suggests, particularly if one takes account of other economic 
factors. Earlier research has pointed to some specific characteristics of the Dutch mortgage 
market, such as a tax deduction for interest on mortgage loans (hypotheekrenteaftrek), a 
government guarantee scheme for low-income borrowers (Nationale Hypotheek Garantie), 
the social benefits system, the low unemployment rate, the good debt ethic, the relatively 
modest use of variable interests, and the stable housing market (Kerste et al., p. 28). Other 
factors that have been named are that the value of all own homes is twice as high as the 
total mortgage debt, and that many Dutch households have pension claims and large 
private savings that exceed the amount of the debt.12 Finally, it should be noted that 
                                                        
11 The number indicated by DNB, though the number may be lower (950.000) if a 
correction is made for mortgages linked to an investment portfolio; see the letter of the 
Minister of Housing and the Central Government Sector to the Speaker of the House of 




12 See the website of the Dutch Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS), http://www.cbs.nl/en-
GB/menu/themas/macro-economie/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2012/2012-3680-wm.htm. 
But note that the Dutch ratio of gross savings to gross disposable income is just below the 
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mortgage debt in the Netherlands appears higher than in other countries because often in 
international comparisons no correction is made for so-called “endowment mortgages”, i.e. 
mortgages where the payments are placed in a savings account purported to be used for 
repayment of the entire loan upon the end of its term.13 In sum, although concerns about 
the stability of the mortgage market are not unfounded, the Dutch have within the 
economic context of their market sought to steer towards a risk-containing strategy for 
mortgage lending. Considering the latent risk posed by the large number of underwater 
mortgages, the question remains however whether the prevention of over-indebtedness can 
be improved by changes in the current regulatory framework. 
 
2. The UK Mortgage Market 
Like the Netherlands, it would be too much of a generalization to characterize the UK 
mortgage market solely on the basis of its household debt rates. As we have seen,14 a high 
household debt ratio – in this case 145 per cent – in practice does not correlate to a higher 
number of defaults on mortgage payments. In the UK the low number of defaults has been 
attributed to low interest rates and lender forbearance (FSA 2012, Datapack, pp. 37-38; 
Scanlon and Elsinga 2014, p. 341). The Financial Policy Committee (FPC), a sub-
committee of the Bank of England’s Court of Directors and responsible for the Bank of 
England’s financial stability report, confirms that household debt is not an immediate 
concern for mortgage regulation in the UK. Practically, this point does seem less of a 
concern than it is in the Netherlands, since most mortgage loans have a much lower LTV 
ratio. Whereas Dutch mortgage loans in most cases exceed the value of the property,15 in 
the UK the ratio is often lower than 90 per cent or even lower than 75 per cent (Bank of 
England 2014, p. 24). The Committee nevertheless indicates that the situation should be 
monitored:  “The FPC does not believe that household indebtedness poses an imminent 
threat to stability. But it has agreed that it is prudent to insure against the risk of a marked 
                                                                                                                                                                        




13 See also the CBS website, http://www.cbs.nl/en-GB/menu/themas/macro-
economie/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2012/2012-3680-wm.htm. 
14 Above, p. 2. 
15 Though recent legislation introduces a gradual decrease towards 100 per cent as the 
maximum LTV ratio, to be completed by 2018 and henceforth applicable to all new 
mortgages. See the Temporary rules on mortgage credit of 2011, discussed further below, p. 
17. 
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loosening in underwriting standards and a further significant rise in the number of highly 
indebted households” (Bank of England 2014, p. 52). 
Responsible lending policy has in the meantime focused on vulnerabilities of the 
UK mortgage market in other respects. Recent reforms have focused primarily on 
introducing more stringent affordability tests, looking at the borrower’s income in relation 
to their committed or essential spending, in order to prevent over-indebtedness.16 The FPC 
more recently indicated that the number of mortgages extended at high(er) LTI multiples 
(or ratios) has increased and that this can pose risks to the resilience of the UK banking 
system. Households are in this situation more likely to encounter payment difficulties in 
the face of shock to income and interest rates (Bank of England 2014, p. 52). Whereas 
countries like the Netherlands – or in the EU also the Scandinavian countries – already had 
regulation in place that prevented defaults by focusing on LTI ratios, the UK should 
perhaps consider more detailed stipulations on this point (Bank of England 2014, pp. 57-58, 
63). The suggestion has been made that mortgage lenders should limit the proportion of 
mortgages at loan to income multiples of 4.5 and above to no more than 15% of their new 
mortgages (Bank of England 2014, p. 52). 
 
What these brief descriptions make clear is that the institutional context of national 
markets has a significant impact on how regulators approach responsible lending issues, in 
particular where creditworthiness assessments are concerned. Choices to come down on 
household debt or the affordability of loans for borrowers, and whether to do this by 
focusing on LTI or LTV ratios or other factors, are much inspired by local concerns. That 
poses challenges for defining a common “responsible lending” policy at EU level, as 
becomes clear when we go back to the text of the Mortgage Credit Directive. Recital 55 of 
the Directive lists a number of factors that can (or should) be taken into account in a 
creditworthiness test, such as LTI and LTV ratios, but (like Art. 18 of the Directive) adopts 
a very general level of guidance. The recital moreover explicitly adds that “Member States 
should be able to issue additional guidance on those or additional criteria and on methods 
to assess a consumer’s creditworthiness, for example by setting limits on loan-to-value or 
loan-to-income ratios.”17 One wonders whether it is possible, in the future, to provide more 
                                                        
16 This is one of the key changes introduced by the MMR. For a discussion, see Part III 
below. 
17 The recital further states that Member States “should be encouraged to implement the 
Financial Stability Board’s Principles for Sound Residential Mortgage Underwriting 
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concrete guidance on what a responsible lending policy should look like. To that end, it is 
worthwhile to study existing approaches in the Member States to better understand which 
regulatory tools are chosen and how they relate to the institutional context described above. 
The next parts consider how the UK and the Netherlands have designed their 
“responsible lending” policies. I focus in particular on (public) regulation and self-
regulation, since the Directive will be implemented as part of these regimes. Private law is 
also relevant to the regulation of mortgage credit relationships, e.g. as a basis for ex post 
actions for compensation in cases where lenders have breached a fiduciary duty towards 
borrowers. However, because of restrictions of scope, private law actions will not be 
discussed in more detail.18 
 
III The UK Reforms  
Regulation of the mortgage credit market in the UK has, in the wake of the financial crisis, 
been under reconsideration since 2009.19 Following the crisis, the UK legislature has 
conducted an extensive Mortgage Market Review. Under the aegis of the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) – which has now for this part of the market been replaced by the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)20 – a wholesale review of existing regulation was 
conducted, taking into account available data and consulting relevant stakeholders in the 
market (e.g. mortgage lenders, intermediaries). The outcome is that a new set of rules has 
come into force on 26 April 2014.21 
The MMR has been given effect through the FCA rules laid down in the FCA 
Handbook, and more specifically the part dealing with Mortgage Conduct of Business 
Rules (MCOB). The inclusion of all types of secured credit in this regime is new and 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Practices.” These principles, also, are general in nature and – although potentially relevant 
as a source for further harmonization – will not be further discussed here. 
18 For further reading, see e.g. Cherednychenko 2011; Mak 2013. 
19 See http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/firm-types/mortgage-brokers-and-home-finance-
lenders/mortgage-market-review. 
20 The FCA now supervises the conduct of market participants, whereas the supervision of 
the prudential regulation and supervision of banks, building societies, credit unions, 
insurers and major investment firms has been brought under the remit of the Prudential 
Regulation Authority (PRA). With this model, effective since 1 April 2013, the UK has 
adopted a so-called “twin peaks”-model of regulation and supervision of the financial 
market. 
21 Only one provision came into effect earlier, on 26 October 2012. MCOB 11.8.1E is an 
evidential provision that seeks to protect so-called “trapped” borrowers, who are unable to 
leave their current lender. The FSA deemed it advisable to introduce this provision with 
immediate effect; see FSA (2012), PS12/16, para. 1.27. 
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widely regarded as an improvement on the pre-existing division of competences. In the 
earlier framework, the regulation of secured credit fell within two separate regimes (Nield 
2012, pp. 162 ff.). Regulated Mortgage Contracts, defined as first legal charges secured 
upon the borrower’s home entered into after 31 October 2004 in the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) were regulated and supervised by the FSA.22 Second charges 
secured upon the borrower’s home, together with unsecured credit, fell within the scope of 
the Consumer Credit Act 1974 and therefore within the remit of the Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT). The two regimes for secured credit were merged when the OFT ceased to exist on 
31 of March 2013. As of 1 April 2013, the majority of its function moved to the 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) and its competence in enforcing consumer 
protection law transferred mostly to the Trading Standards Services.23 Consumer credit 
regulation, including all secured credit, from that date falls under the remit of the FCA. 
The MMR hence has been given effect through the FCA rules laid down in the FCA 
Handbook, and more specifically the part dealing with MCOB. 
 The new rules make significant changes in relation to responsible lending, placing 
more responsibility in particularly on lenders to go beyond information disclosure and to 
take a greater role in assessing the affordability of loans to consumers (compare Nield 
2012, pp. 169, 178). This part gives an overview of the development of responsible lending 
duties in the UK, starting with a brief look at the pre-MMR regime and then moving to the 
present regulation under the MCOB rules. 
 
1. ‘Responsible Lending’ Before the Entry into Force of the MMR 
Leading up to the MMR, the UK legislature had already taken some steps toward the 
introduction of a concept of responsible lending in the broader field of credit (relating to 
unsecured credit and second charges). The Consumer Credit Act 2006 stipulated that a new 
s.25(2B) should be included in the Act. This section, dealing with the requirements for 
lenders to obtain a licence in the UK, provided that the OFT could withhold a licence to 
lenders who were engaged in business practice “appearing to the OFT to be deceitful or 
oppressive or otherwise unfair or improper (whether unlawful or not).”24 Such business 
                                                        
22 See Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001, Art. 61 
(as amended). 
23 For a brief overview of the changes, see 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http://www.oft.gov.uk/about-
the-oft/work-and-responsibilities. 
24 See Consumer Credit Act 2006, s.29. 
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practices, it was specified further, include practices that appear to the OFT to involve 
irresponsible lending.25 
 The Act did not give further information on what was understood by (ir)responsible 
lending. To clarify what should be understood by the term, the OFT issued a guidance 
document in 2010, with further updates in 2011 (OFT 2010/2011). In relation to assessing 
the affordability of credit to a borrower – an important part of preventing over-
indebtedness – the document provides some very general guidelines that should be applied 
to credit agreements regulated by the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (OFT 2010/2011, para. 
4.10). Apart from mentioning “the amount of credit to be provided and the associated cost 
and risk to the borrower”, the document does not indicate in more precise terms how the 
affordability of a loan should be assessed. The guidelines in broad terms mostly point to 
characteristics of the borrower, such as his “financial situation” and his “credit history”. 
Nevertheless, the guidelines adopt a strongly cautionary tone. Some provisions reflect a 
high level of caution expected by the OFT, such as guidelines in relation to the impact of 
changes (unemployment, retirement) on the borrower’s ability to repay the loan. Moreover, 
the list of examples is not exhaustive and creditors are expected to have regard to “both the 
letter and the spirit” of the guidance (OFT 2010/2011, para. 1.21). 
 In relation to secured credit, by comparison, for first charges on home’s Rule 11 of 
the MCOB required lenders to take into account the borrower’s ability to pay. However, it 
was left to lenders to develop their own policies against which to determine affordability 
(Nield 2012, p. 174). The OFT’s guidance on second charges only gave general guidelines 
to lenders which mainly instructed lenders to provide information relevant to the loan and 
to “encourage” the borrower to consider whether she could afford the credit (OFT 2009, in 
particular para. 3.14). 
 
2. Mortgage Market Review 
The weaker points of the UK regulatory framework for mortgage lending came to light, 
and were perhaps a first indicator that stricter lending requirements should be introduced, 
when the global financial crisis started in 2007. As it turns out, many consumers had been 
able to obtain mortgages of a value well exceeding the underlying assets – their homes – 
and without significant difficulty. Empirical studies indicate that prior to the crisis, when 
the housing market was at its peak, over half of all mortgages were granted without 
                                                        
25 Ibid. 
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verification of income (FSA 2012, Datapack, p. 59). A significant number of these 
concerned high LTV mortgage agreements (i.e. agreements where the amount of the loan 
was high in comparison to the value of the property) and were granted to higher-risk 
borrower types (FSA 2012, p. 60). In a falling housing market, as well as a prolonged 
period of economic recession, many borrowers got into financial difficulty. Moreover, the 
housing market itself stagnated as housing prices dropped and homeowners became more 
reluctant, or unable, to sell and purchase property. In response to this, the UK government 
started a consultation in 2009 which resulted in a FSA Policy Statement and final rules in 
October 2012.26 
 The new rules seek to ensure access to the mortgage market ‘for the vast majority 
of customers who can afford it’ whilst bringing to an end the poor mortgages practices of 
previous years (FSA 2012, para. 1.8). Key changes concern stricter duties of responsible 
lending imposed on lenders, a new requirement that all interactive sales should be advised, 
and shifting the responsibility for the test of affordability of the credit entirely towards 
lenders (and no longer imposing it on intermediaries), as well as some changes to 
information provision which anticipate on the introduction of the EU Mortgage Credit 
Directive (FSA 2012, Table 1 and para. 1.10).  
 
3. Rules on Responsible Lending 
Responsible lending is now more specifically defined in the MCOB according to three 
separate duties (cf. FSA 2012, para. 1.9). First, lenders are required to verify the 
affordability of a loan for the borrower,27 taking into account the borrower’s (verified) net 
income and, as a minimum, the borrower’s committed expenditure and basic household 
expenditure. This duty is part of a wider obligation to determine the suitability of a 
mortgage for the borrower.28 Second, an interest stress test must take account of the impact 
on mortgage payments of market expectations of future interest rate increases.29 And 
                                                        
26 For the final rules, see FSA (2012), PS12/16. All relevant documentation can be 
consulted at www.fca.org.uk/firms/firm-types/mortgage-brokers-and-home-finance-
lenders/mortgage-market-review. 
27 A general declaration by the customer as to affordability will no longer suffice; see Rule 
11.6.6R. 
28 See Mortgage Market Review (Conduct of Business) Instrument 2012, which introduces 
changes to the MCOB, in this case Rule 4.7A.6. 
29 Rules 11.6.5R(4) and 11.6.18R. 
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finally, for interest-only mortgages, the lender must ensure that the borrower has an 
acceptable repayment strategy.30 
Although the new regulation places more detailed duties on lenders than it did 
before, leeway is left for lenders to make their own assessment. Initially, the FSA proposed 
even more exhaustive rules on the requirements that lenders would have to comply with in 
order to satisfy the norm of responsible lending. Following feedback from the industry, the 
FSA has opted for a less prescriptive approach (FSA 2012, Annex I). Lenders are to a large 
extent free to determine for themselves which requirements they will introduce to assess 
the affordability of loans for borrowers and the conditions for entering into interest-only 
mortgage agreements.  
Notwithstanding this freedom, the rules introduce a number of minimum 
requirements with which lenders should comply. Section 11.6 sets out minimum 
requirements for responsible lending and financing, specifying in particular how the 
assessment of affordability of a mortgage for a borrower should be conducted. Rule 
11.6.5R stipulates that, when assessing whether a customer will be able to pay the sums 
due, the lender must take account of “the income of the customer, net of income tax and 
national insurance”, and as a minimum “the customer’s committed expenditure” and “the 
basic essential expenditure and basic quality-of-living costs of the customer’s household.” 
The rules thus engage with the LTI ratio, even if they do not prescribe exact numbers.31 
They give at least minimum guidance as to the factors that should be taken into account in 
the affordability assessment, but room for differentiation remains. Earlier studies show that 
many lenders have some model or methodology to assess the affordability of mortgage 
credit to a borrower, and that they use data from public sources such as the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS) to estimate expenditure (Oxera 2010, pp. 14-15). Methods 
nonetheless vary considerably and under the new rules – even if they lay down a minimum 
– are likely to continue to differ between lenders. 
The new rules on responsible lending reflect a significant policy change in 
consumer mortgage credit regulation. Credit regulation in the UK more generally speaking 
– including unsecured loans – has traditionally been hesitant to impose ceilings or 
restrictions on borrowing. The system has tended to pay head to concerns of accessibility 
of credit to a broad group of borrowers, and in that vein ceilings on credit were regarded as 
potentially creating financial exclusion and increasing illegal lending (Ramsay 2013, p. 
                                                        
30 Rule 11.6.41R. 
31 See rule 11.6.5R(2). 
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101). The new rules do create restrictions on obtaining mortgages, and push towards 
applying lower LTI ratios in order to prevent consumers from falling into arrears with their 
mortgage payments.32 
 
4. Effectiveness, Supervision and Enforcement 
Whether the new regime offers an effective response to problems in the mortgage market 
in terms of achieving “responsible lending”, or fewer cases of over-indebtedness, is 
however hard to determine. Recent data indicate that the number of defaults – which 
increased after the crisis – has steadily begun to show a downward trend.33 Whether that is 
due to the introduction of a more restrictive regulatory regime for the mortgage market, 
however, is hard to say. A recovery of the economy may be pointed to as a potential cause 
(Bank of England 2014). 
In the light of continuing developments in the market, it is not strange that new 
recommendations have already been made since the entry into force of the MMR rules. 
Notably, with regard to an interest rate stress test, the FPC proposes that it should assess 
“whether borrowers could still afford their mortgages if, at any point over the first five 
years of the loan, [the] Bank Rate were to be 3 percentage points higher than the prevailing 
rate at origination” (Bank of England 2014, p. 52). Further, some points require renewed 
consideration. For example, although lenders generally seem to favour the flexibility that 
the new rules still allow, they also point out that this same flexibility can create supervisory 
problems or enable risk-averse behaviour of lenders that could harm certain groups of 
borrowers (FSA 2012, Annex I, para. 7). The FCA has the power to enforce the new rules 
through suspension or restriction of licences to lenders, or through penalties.34 The norm 
that lenders should take account of certain or likely changes in the customer’s income or 
expenditure (rule 11.6.14R) may however be hard to apply in practice. What to do in cases 
where a customer has a fixed term contract but an otherwise impeccable credit history and 
good job prospects? A change in income is in this case foreseeable, however a lender may 
find it a commercially sound decision to nevertheless extend credit in these circumstances. 
One may wonder whether, if the customer falls into arrears, the lender can be considered in 
breach of the FCA conduct of business rules (Council of Mortgage Lenders 2012, paras. 
                                                        
32 Note also the FPC’s recommendation that mortgage lenders should limit the proportion 
of mortgages at high LTI multiples; Bank of England (2014), p. 52. 
33 For statistics on arrears and possessions, see the Council of Mortgage Lenders website: 
http://www.cml.org.uk/cml/media/press/3894. 
34 FCA Decisions Procedure and Penalties Manual (DEPP). 
 14
14-15). More risk-averse lenders may in such circumstances decide to deny credit, which is 
likely to harm certain consumer groups, such as those who are self-employed or on fixed 
term contracts. Stricter duties of responsible lending may therefore overshoot their goal in 
respect of certain potential borrowers. Revision may at some point be required. 
Importantly also, regulatory policies, in combination with other government 
interventions, often have wider effects on the housing market.35 Even if post-crisis policy 
interventions have helped the UK housing market recover faster than other (e.g. the Dutch) 
housing markets, it has been pointed out that they come with significant effects on the 
market. For example, demand for owner-occupied housing is likely to drop, whereas an 
increase may be expected in demand for private rentals. To support such expectations, it is 
necessary for the government to keep a close eye on the availability of such housing in the 
market and, where possible, to intervene (Scanlon and Elsinga 2014, p. 358). Regular 
monitoring, and possible revision of regulation and other policy interventions will be 
required. 
 
IV The Dutch Comparison: More Detailed Modalities for ‘Responsible Lending’36 
The comparison with the Netherlands shows that under its ‘responsible lending’ policy, 
which is mainly aimed at preventing over-indebtedness of consumers, the rules were 
already stricter than in the UK in pre-2007 regulation. Most notably, more precise rules 
have been in place to assess affordability of credit or “creditworthiness”. Also, the 
restrictions on lending in cases where a consumer fails the creditworthiness assessment 
have been greater than in the UK, as regulation stipulates that a credit provider is in those 
circumstances prohibited from entering into the credit agreement.37 The regulation 
moreover prescribes a “comply or explain” regime.38 
This part sketches the development and current structure of the Dutch regime for 
regulation of the consumer mortgage market. It should be noted that the regulatory 
framework has a different set up than in the UK. The provision of mortgage credit to 
consumers is regulated through both public and private regulation. The most important 
                                                        
35 Important is also Sarah Nield’s finding that “common sense” approaches to affordability 
in the mortgage sale process is of limited utility unless it is matched with fitting 
approaches to the consequences of mortgage default and overall housing policy. See Nield 
(2015). 
36 I gratefully acknowledge the collaboration of Marie-Claire Menting on this part of the 
article. 
37 Art. 4:34 Wet op het financieel toezicht (Wft).  
38 See below, p. 17. 
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instruments are the Dutch Financial Supervision Act (Wet op het financieel toezicht – Wft) 
and accompanying regulations, and the Code of Conduct for Mortgage Loans 
(Gedragscode Hypothecaire Financieringen – GHF).39 According to its wording the GHF 
is in essence voluntary in nature: it governs mortgage loans offered and/or advanced by 
mortgage lenders that have entered into “the agreement for the self-regulation of a 
mortgage loan.”40 Since the majority of lenders subscribe to the GHF, its norms can be 
considered common knowledge in practice: the lenders have set a norm for the market and 
the industry considers the norms as guiding principles (AFM 2007, p. 40; Kerste et al. 
2011, p. 55). Whereas the GHF until recently was the most important source of rules on 
creditworthiness assessments, it has recently been superseded by legislation. 
 
1. The Financial Supervision Act and the GHF 
The interplay between the GHF, and public regulation and supervision takes place through 
the open norm of responsible lending laid down in Art. 4:34 of the Dutch Financial 
Supervision Act (Wft). The first section of the article sets out, in short, the obligation for 
offerors of credit to obtain information on the financial position of the consumer before 
concluding a credit contract or before substantially raising the credit limit or the sum of the 
loans. On the basis of this information, the offeror has “to assess, in order to prevent 
overextension of credit to the consumer, whether concluding the contract would be 
justified.”41 Art. 4:34 sub 2 stipulates, in short, that no credit contract is to be concluded 
and no substantial raise of the credit limit or the sum of the loans is to be granted “where 
this would not be justified with a view to overextension of credit to the consumer.”42 Art. 
4:34 has been elaborated further in Artt. 113-115 Besluit Gedragstoezicht ondernemingen 
Wft (BGfo). With regard to the GHF, Art. 115 sub 1 BGfo is of particular relevance, 
stipulating that in order to prevent overextension of credit, an offeror of credit has to set 
                                                        
39 The Code and explanatory notes can be downloaded at, for instance, 
www.nvb.nl/publicaties/1671/gedragscode-hypothecaire-financieringen.html (Dutch and 
English version of the Code available). 
40 Art 1 in conjunction with art 2 GHF. Cf. Kerste et al. (2011), p. 55. The scope of the 
GHF also extends to mortgage brokers; see Art 17 of the GHF. 
41 Cf the translation of Art 4:34 sub 1 Wft on www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-
publicaties/brieven/2009/11/16/engelse-vertaling-van-de-wft.html. Art. 4:34 in its current 




criteria to assess the application for credit of a consumer. The GHF contains such criteria, 
as will be described in more detail below.  
The essence of Art. 4:34 Wft is that the lender is responsible for assessing whether 
the credit is affordable for the consumer, at the moment when the credit agreement is 
concluded as well as for extensions of credit during the term of the loan (AFM 2009, p. 14; 
Kerste et al. (2011), p. 57). Apart from the rules set in the BGfo, the open norm of 
responsible lending has not been substantiated by the legislature. The legislature indicated 
that it is in the first instance up to the offeror of credit to do so, which led to the mortgage 
lending industry adding specifications of the open norm in the GHF (Dijkhuizen and Caria 
2013, p. 117; Netherlands Minister of Finance 2009; C. F. J. van Tuyll 2010, p. 31). 
Although both the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) and the 
legislature generally value the self-regulatory system to prevent overextension of credit, 
they have on several occasions pressured the industry to tighten the norms of the Code in 
response to poor lending practices that had led to financial risks for consumers and 
insufficient compliance with elements of the Code (AFM 2007, pp. 487 ff.; Van Boom 
2012, p. 271; Roelofsen 2011). The AFM, which supervises compliance with the Wft and 
hence enforces Art. 4:34 Wft, has also specified more detailed criteria for responsible 
lending to consumers in the context of mortgage credit (AFM 2009, pp. 14-15), with 
reference to the GHF. 
The GHF, besides prescribing which (pre-contractual) information has to be 
provided to consumers, also sets out the criteria to be used to assess the borrowing capacity 
of a consumer.43 The central norm in this respect is formulated in Art 6 sub 1 of the GHF: 
“The mortgage lender shall assess individually every application by a borrower for a 
mortgage loan on the basis of the borrower’s financial position and credit status and the 
value of the offered collateral, including the residence that is to serve as collateral for the 
repayment of the mortgage loan.” The framework for assessing whether and to what 
amount giving a mortgage loan can be considered responsible is therefore based on two 
elements: the income of the borrower (the LTI ratio) and the market value of the residence 
(the LTV ratio).  
                                                        
43 Art. 4:33 sub 1 Wft contains, in short, a general duty to provide (pre-contractual) 
information. It is however not applicable to mortgage credit lenders (cf. Art 111 Bgfo) 
since the issue of pre-contractual information is regulated by the European Code of 
Conduct, which is incorporated in the GHF. See Tuinstra and Giphart (2013), p. 298. 
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At this level, the rules are quite similar to the UK rules after the MMR. However, 
further detail is added to the Dutch rules: the maximum amount of the gross expenses 
linked to a mortgage loan is to be determined upon the current housing costs set by the 
National Institute for Family Finance Information (NIBUD). Under certain circumstances, 
it is possible to obtain a higher loan than the maximum amount stipulated by GHF. At this 
point, the GHF has a “comply or explain” nature. The possibilities to deviate from the 
norms exist in certain well-defined cases. Additionally, a qualitative explain clause exists: 
deviation from the rules on borrowing capacity is possible in exceptional cases provided 
that, inter alia, the reasons for deviating are recorded and substantiated (Art 6.10 GHF). In 
practice, the “explain” mortgage was used quite often until 2008 but use of it has since 
subsided with the introduction of restrictions by the supervisory authority, the AFM. Since 
then, the number of “explain” mortgages has dropped from 30 per cent in 2007-2008 to 10 
per cent in 2009 (Kerste et al. (2011), pp. ii and xi). 
 
2. Temporary Rules on Mortgage Credit 
On 1 January 2013, however, the regulatory landscape for the mortgage credit market 
changed with the enactment of the Temporary rules on mortgage credit (Tijdelijke regeling 
hypothecair krediet).44 As of this date, the formulation of criteria for the assessment of the 
borrowing capacity of a consumer is no longer a predominantly private matter.45 The rules 
laid down by the ministerial regulation concern the norms to be taken into account by a 
mortgage lender when assessing the borrowing capacity of a borrower for a mortgage 
loan.46 As such, the regulation covers a topic that was formerly regulated by the GHF. 
Since the legislature took, inter alia, the rules of the GHF into account while drafting the 
regulation, the provisions of the regulation show a considerable overlap with the rules on 
borrowing capacity set out by the GHF. Not only do both the regulation and the GHF 
stipulate which income criteria are to be applied when assessing an application by a 
borrower for a mortgage loan (LTI ratio), both regulatory frameworks also set a ratio 
between the maximum amount of mortgage credit that can be granted and the value of the 
residence (LTV ratio). Maximums are now set at a LTV ratio of 106 per cent and this ratio 
                                                        
44 Netherlands Government Gazette 2012, no. 26433. For amendments to these rules as of 
1/1/2014, see Parliamentary Papers II 2013/14, 32847, no. 98. 
45 Cf. Art. 115 sub 1 BGfo. 
46 The regulation is an implementation of Art 115 sub 3 BGfo which reads that income 
criteria and the maximum amount of mortgage credit in relation to the value of the 
residence are to be laid down by ministerial regulation. 
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will be lowered with 1 percentage point per year until it reaches, and stays at 100 per cent 
from 2018 onwards.47 The regulation as well as the GHF allow for deviation from these 
rules in well-delineated cases.48 Some of the GHF provisions on borrowing capacity thus 
became legally enshrined.  
The reason for laying the income criteria down by regulation was found in the lack 
of clarity that existed on the mortgage market as regards the interpretation of the income 
criteria for 2012 due to an announcement of the AFM. In 2012, the AFM notified the banks 
that in its opinion the NIBUD norms for double income-households with a total income 
between 30.000 and 40.000 euros could not be considered as ‘responsible lending’ in 
advance. The legislature decided to intervene and to lay down the income criteria by 
regulation, in order to prevent any future confusion on the norms that have to be applied by 
mortgage lenders to assess an application for mortgage credit. Art. 115 sub 4 BGfo 
stipulates that mortgage lenders have to apply the criteria set out in the Temporary rules on 
mortgage credit, in addition to the criteria set by themselves (cf. Art. 115 sub 1 BGfo).49 
The phrase “in addition” implies that the GHF did not cease to exist. The norms set 
out by the Temporary rules are minimum norms. Mortgage lenders thus have the 
possibility to apply more stringent norms.50 The enactment of the Temporary rules 
however will lead to a revision of the GHF to prevent double rules. The self-regulatory 
provisions that have become legally enshrined will be deleted. Up until that has been done, 
the Temporary rules take precedence over the GHF.51 
 
3. Effectiveness, Supervision and Enforcement 
It may be that stricter regulation is a logical follow-up to a financial crisis, with the 
government seeking to obtain new control over the housing market. From that perspective, 
government intervention (partly) replacing self-regulation in the Netherlands is not 
surprising. It also means that supervision of the rules is placed more firmly in the hands of 
the AFM, who before the introduction of the Temporary rules indirectly (i.e. through the 
open norm of Art. 4:34 Wft and Artt. 113 ff. Bgfo) supervised compliance with the GHF as 
                                                        
47 Temporary rules on mortgage credit, Art. 5. 
48 Netherlands Government Gazette 2012, no. 26433, 6. 
49 Netherlands Government Gazette 2012, no. 26433, 6; Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2012, 
695, 97; Parliamentary Papers II 2013/14, 32 847, no. 32. Cf. also Tuinstra and Giphart 
(2013), p. 299, and www.afm.nl/nl/nieuws/2012/jan/verruiming-leencapaciteit-
tweeverdieners.aspx for the press release of AFM on the NIBUD norms concerned. 
50 Netherlands Government Gazette 2012, no. 26433, 6. 
51 www.nvb.nl/nieuws/2012/1639/tijdelijke-regeling-hypothecair-krediet.html.  
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part of its task to monitor conduct in the financial markets (AFM 2007, pp. 40-41; AFM 
2009, p. 15; Van Boom 2012, p. 271). 
For rules to be effective, however, it is not just important to know that they achieve 
their set goals, but also that they do not overshoot those goals and go further than is 
necessary to achieve them, potentially even imposing unnecessary restrictions on 
borrowers (Kerste et al. 2011, p. xii). One wonders whether the rules that have been 
developed post-crisis manage to strike the right balance. Dutch rules seem to have become 
more restrictive than need be if one considers the relatively low default on payments of 
Dutch borrowers in comparison to other countries (Kerste et al. 2011, p. 28). As indicated 
in part II, the real motivation of the legislator appears to be to push down the existing, very 
high household debt ratio. An effect of the new rules, however, might be that it becomes 
more difficult for certain borrowers to obtain mortgages; an effect that may be reinforced 
by proposed adjustments to the NIBUD norms relating to the costs of housing.52 Like in 
the UK, this may result in a greater demand for rental housing – a development that may 
require monitoring and intervention by the government to ensure that housing expectations 
are met.53 
Whichever way that assessment is made, the question remains how the EU 
Mortgage Credit Directive will fit into the existing regimes found in the Member States 
and whether it can contribute to a responsible lending policy in both Member States. It is 
now time to return to this question. 
 
V Introducing the EU’s Responsible Lending Policy in Dutch and UK Regulation  
The EU Consumer Mortgage Credit Directive, as indicated, contains a minimum 
harmonization provision (Art. 18) which obliges Member States to maintain or introduce 
rules that oblige lenders to carry out creditworthiness assessments on borrowers. Looking 
at other elements of a “responsible lending” policy,54 the Directive for a large part draws 
on the norms on conduct of business in the Consumer Credit Directive55 and creates a 
similar framework for mortgage credit, taking into account the specificities of mortgage 
                                                        
52 ‘Duurder huis, minder lenen’, NRC Handelsblad, 21 november 2014, p. 4; see also 
http://www.nrcq.nl/2014/11/21/je-kunt-straks-minder-lenen-en-wat-er-nog-meer-gaat-
veranderen-op-de-woningmarkt. 
53 See p. 14. 
54 See p. 1. 
55 Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumers [2008] OJ L133/66. 
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credit where appropriate.56 The rules concern financial education of consumers (Art. 6), 
information and practices preliminary to the conclusion of the credit agreement (Art 10. 
Ff.), the annual percentage rate of charge (Art 17.), the creditworthiness assessment (Art. 
18 ff.), database access (Art. 21), advice (Art. 22), early repayment (Art. 25 ff) and 
prudential and supervisory requirements (Art. 29 ff.). As said earlier, the provisions of the 
Directive are for the most part aimed at minimum harmonisation, apart from those relating 
to the standardized information provided through the ESIS and the information concerning 
the annual percentage rate of charge (APRC) which aim for full harmonisation (see Art. 2). 
It is noteworthy that the introduction of the ESIS for UK lenders signals a change. Until 
now, certain information has been provided through a Key Facts Illustration (KFI). The 
ESIS requires more information to be provided and in a different format. To facilitate the 
transition to the new format, the UK government has negotiated an extension with the 
European Commission which means that lenders will need to have transferred to the new 
format by March 2019 (instead of March 2016).57 Also, it may be that explanations given 
to consumers before the lender has assessed their financial situation and their 
creditworthiness will need to be adapted after such an assessment is made, and in good 
time before the credit agreement is signed, albeit that no separate document needs to be 
drawn up.58 
Another important feature of the Directive is that it prescribes a strict 
creditworthiness assessment.59 Such an assessment fits with the aim of preventing over-
indebtedness that the EU pursues, and is often considered a cost-effective tool since 
lenders have developed long-standing experience with screening and monitoring of clients 
(see eg Domurath 2015; Atamer 2011). The creditworthiness assessment focuses in 
particular on the ability of the borrower to repay the loan. To that end, the lender should 
assess (and verify!) the ability of the borrower to repay the loan over his lifetime, taking 
account in particular of future payment or interest increases. If the Court of Justice of the 
EU (CJEU)’s approach to the creditworthiness assessment under the Consumer Credit 
Directive is followed this would however not preclude the lender from making that 
                                                        
56 COM(2011) 142 final, 4. 
57 http://www.addleshawgoddard.com/view.asp?content_id=7360&parent_id=6606. 
58 CJEU 18 December 2014, Case C-449/13 CA Consumer Finance SA v. Bakkaus and 
Bonato, nyr, paras 45-47. 
59 Like the Consumer Credit Directive in Art 8. Notably, lenders who do not carry out 
a creditworthiness assessment may be liable to penalties, such as losing the right to 
claim interest; which may then not be replaced by statutory interest, see CJEU 27 
March 2014, Case C-565/12 LCL Le Crédit Lyonnais SA v. Kalhan, nyr, para 55. 
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assessment on the basis solely of information supplied by the consumer, “provided that that 
information is sufficient and that mere declarations by the consumer are also accompanied 
by supporting evidence”.60 Further, the affordability of the credit “should be considered in 
the light of other regular expenditure, debts and other financial commitments as well as 
income, savings and assets.”61 The Directive emphasizes moreover that whilst the LTV 
factor is important in the assessment, the main focus should be on the ability of the 
consumer to repay the credit. The possibility of value increases of the property should 
therefore not be the determinative element.62 Moreover, account should be taken of (at the 
time of concluding the credit agreement) future events that may influence the borrower’s 
ability to repay the loan, such as loss of income or, where applicable, an increase in the 
borrowing rate or a negative change in the exchange rate.63 
The duty to assess the borrower’s creditworthiness is combined with a duty to deny 
credit if the consumer does not fulfil it. Although not explicitly phrased like this in the UK 
rules, it would seem that the affordability assessment laid down in rule 11.6.5 of the 
MCOB prescribes a similar approach. Significantly different from before in the UK the 
new regulation therefore places a duty on lenders to deny credit where consumers do not 
fulfil the creditworthiness assessment. Dutch law already contained such a duty in Art. 
4:34 sub 2 Wft.64 
 How do the Directive’s new rules more specifically contribute to responsible 
lending policies in the UK and the Netherlands? As has been seen, different regulatory 
choices in these Member States are informed by the sources of risk that regulators seek to 
control, for example household debt ratios. These choices will also colour the way in 
which the EU Directive’s responsible lending policy is translated into national laws. In all 
likelihood the modalities of that policy will remain very different from one jurisdiction to 
another. If we just focus on LTI and LTV ratios as modalities for assessment, the following 
can be observed. 
Looking at the Netherlands, the way in which loans are assessed is considered to be 
an important attributing factor to the low rate of defaults on mortgages in the Netherlands. 
                                                        
60 CJEU CA Consumer Finance SA, para 39. The Court also holds that the creditor is not 
required to carry out systematic checks of the veracity of the information supplied by 
the consumer. 
61 Mortgage Credit Directive, recital 55. 
62 Mortgage Credit Directive, recital 55 and Art. 18(3). 
63 Ibid. 
64 See p. 15. 
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In particular the focus on LTI as an element of the creditworthiness assessment of 
borrowers is regarded as an important contribution towards responsible lending, as it is 
supposed to be a better indicator of borrowers’ ability to repay their loan than the LTV 
assessment (Kerste et al. 2011, p. 28-29). LTI requirements are correspondingly strict in 
Dutch regulation: fixed ratios are set by the NIBUD norms and the Temporary rules on 
mortgage credit. Furthermore, they apply in a ‘comply or explain’ manner, meaning that 
divergence from these ratios is only possible if the lender can verify that the borrower will 
be able to repay the loan.65 
 The UK, until recently, did not strictly regulate LTI requirements apart from the 
more general guidance provided by the OFT. The post-MMR framework shows that LTI 
assessments have become more important for assessing the affordability of credit for 
borrowers. It is nevertheless noteworthy that the precise conditions for LTI ratios are not 
prescribed by the regulator but may be determined by lenders. Although that does not have 
to be problematic – since lenders also have an interest in minimizing defaults on mortgage 
payments, in particular where house prices may fluctuate – it means that the control over 
LTI ratios is not as strictly monitored as it is in the Netherlands. In cases where discretion 
exists, it may even be hard to determine which decisions will satisfy the supervisory 
authority. 
 LTV ratios, secondly, are also used as indicators for creditworthiness assessments 
and have gained particular significance in policies aimed at restraining household debt. 
Dutch LTV ratios, as we have seen, appear to be overall higher than those in the UK, since 
they are in most cases higher than 100 per cent whereas UK ratios tend to be lower. The 
fact that these ratios are high in the Netherlands is perhaps the most significant explanation 
for the country’s extremely high household debt ratio. Even if LTI ratios are contained, it 
does make the financial system more vulnerable to market fluctuations, in particular now 
that many mortgages are “under water”. The Dutch legislator’s introduction of (gradually) 
stricter limitations LTV ratios through the 2012 Temporary rules for mortgage credit is 
therefore in line with seeking to bring down household debt. Although household debt 
ratios in the UK are also high, the issue seems less pressing than in the Netherlands (Bank 
of England 2014, p. 52). 
 Now placing the EU Mortgage Credit Directive’s provisions on the 
creditworthiness assessment beside the two national regimes, it would appear that both 
                                                        
65 See above, p. 17. 
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fulfil the requirements of the Directive on a general level. Each regime prescribes 
modalities for affordability assessments and both include an evaluation of LTI ratios and 
LTV ratios, albeit with different degrees of precision. Other factors, such as interest 
increases, other debts and available savings are also generally taken into account.66  
Turning to the creditworthiness assessment, it seems likely that the factors listed in 
the Directive may in any event contribute to the effectiveness of the Member States’ 
responsible lending policies by giving an additional boost to regulators to ensure that their 
policies are in order. However, whether the Directive is going to add significant new 
substance to these policies has yet to be seen. As we have seen in the comparison of the 
UK and the Netherlands, the responsible lending policies in both countries have recently 
been revised to now include detailed and stricter rules, in particular to prevent over-
indebtedness. The Directive’s generally phrased terms would appear to make it possible to 
comply with it without introducing many new rules (Giphart 2014). Also, the suspicion is 
confirmed that the rules of the Directive enable national regulators to still pursue a 
responsible lending policy that they deem best fitted to their national financial markets. 
There is for example no hard and fast rule as to how LTI and LTV ratios should be 
weighed in a creditworthiness assessment. The Directive gives guidance, but otherwise 
leaves almost any decision to the Member States’ regulators.67 The UK and the Dutch 
regimes, although different in many respects, therefore both seem to fulfil the Directive’s 
goals. 
Interestingly, nonetheless, the comparison of the two systems reveals several 
common issues encountered by regulators in the mortgage credit market, which might well 
provide a basis for further work on a common responsible lending policy. First, in each 
system questions have arisen as to whether new regulations do not overshoot their goal. 
Even if stricter control of TLV and LTI ratios may go some way towards ensuring more 
responsible credit decisions, stricter regulation also entails that certain groups of borrowers 
will not be able to obtain a mortgage, or only with much difficulty.68 Such reforms are 
therefore likely to have effects on the housing market, e.g. a decrease in demand of owner-
occupied housing (Scanlon and Elsinga 2014). Within the wider institutional framework – 
such as government schemes to support home ownership or to assist borrowers in difficult 
                                                        
66 See Mortgage Credit Directive, recital 55. 
67 Apart perhaps from the rule that construction or renovation of a property can be 
considered as a ground for assuming a future increase in value of the property; see 
Mortgage Credit Directve, Art. 18(3). 
68 On the UK, p. 14, and on the Netherlands, p. 19. 
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times – regulation can thus be an important tool for legislators and policymakers to 
(purport to) control the housing market. Its effects, such as a likely increased demand for 
rental housing in the UK and in the Netherlands (Scanlon and Elsinga 2014, p. 358), 
deserve to be monitored in order to take appropriate action where needed.  
Further, the format of rules, in particular whether they allow room for flexibility of 
lenders in loan decisions, can make it more difficult for the supervising authority to 
monitor compliance. The Netherlands has adopted a “comply or explain” regime for 
mortgage lending, in which the benchmark for assessment is provided by the NIBUD 
norms for costs of housing. That solution can increase compliance, and bring down the 
costs of monitoring compliance, but of course it is preceded by a policy question, namely 
whether such restrictions are regarded as acceptable. UK lenders have not been willing to 
concede their flexibility in laying down specific rules for assessing affordability. These 
diverging approaches also, perhaps on the basis of experiences with both regimes, can 
provide further testing ground for responsible lending policies. 
Finally, from a broader perspective of lawmaking in consumer markets, the 
regulation of mortgage credit in the UK and in the Netherlands provides interesting 
examples of the interaction between public regulation and self-regulation. The shift in both 
systems towards greater regulatory coverage, although in these cases accelerated by a crisis 
in the housing market, shows how informal norms are turned into formal regulation. As is 
shown in particular by the Dutch example, regulators are willing to acknowledge norms 
developed through self-regulation and in their design of new regulation to explicitly take 
these norms into account. That process is similar to the way in which the EU Mortgage 
Credit Directive came into being, with the Directive being based on, and adopting rules 
from, the European Voluntary Code of Conduct on Pre-Contractual Information for Home 
Loans.69 Such processes of interaction, at national and at EU level, indicate that bottom-up 
emergence of norms could well be indicative for determining an appropriate balance 
between lender and borrower interests in “responsible lending” (compare Zumbansen 
2011). Even though this may take some time. 
 
VI Conclusion 
                                                        
69 Agreement on a Voluntary Code of Conduct on Pre-Contractual Information for Home 
Loans, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/docs/home-
loans/agreement_en.pdf. See also European Commission, Commission Recommendation 
on pre-contractual information to be given to consumers by lenders offering home loans 
[2001] OJ L69/25. 
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The conclusion must therefore be that even though it is possible to distinguish common 
elements of a “responsible lending” policy at EU level, specific rules remain diverse from 
one jurisdiction to another. Financial markets have their own, particular characteristics and 
regulators at (in this case) national levels are free to adjust their responsible lending 
policies to the sources of risk that they seek to control. In the UK the focus currently 
appears to be on preventing defaults on mortgage payments whereas the Netherlands seeks 
to pursue policies that can push down the high level of household debt in the country. 
Other Member States, although not researched in this article, are likely to have their own 
and probably again different issues to solve (compare Ramsay 2013 on the UK and France). 
It could even be fair to say that the Mortgage Credit Directive was probably inspired by the 
relatively weaker mortgage regulations in southern-European Member States, such as 
Spain, which might benefit from more robust rules for mortgage lending.  Even in times of 
increasing globalization, some issues remain local. 
The comparison of how responsible lending policies are turned into regulation in 
different legal systems, nonetheless, reveals some aspects that could be of great relevance 
for future efforts to design responsible lending policies. In relation to the balancing of 
substantive rules, the design of supervision schemes, and the interaction with views from 
the industry, law reforms in the UK and the Dutch mortgage markets provide useful 
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